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1. INTRODUCTION
Some books, Umberto Eco once said, seem to be easier to review than they are to
read. There is something about them that makes them far more predisposed to
commentary than to simple reading. Take, for instance, Kant’sCritique of Pure Reason
orGrotius’sDe JureBelli ac Pacis. Books like this are almost impossible to readwithout
constantly reformulating their theses: ‘it is only by applying yourself to a gloss that
youcan followtheir argumentationwithoutdistraction, their implacable syllogistic
necessities,or thepreciseknotsofrelation’.1 Suchbookshavefewadmirers,butmany
commentators.
And then there are other books,
books that are extremely pleasant to read, but impossible to write about: because the
minute you start expounding them or commenting on them, you realize that they
refuse to be translated into the proposition ‘This book says that.’ The personwho reads
them for pleasure realizes he has spent hismoneywell; but anyonewho reads them in
order to tell others about thembecomes furious at every line, tears up thenotes he took
amoment before, seeks the conclusion that comes after his ‘therefore,’ and cannot ﬁnd
it.2
Take, for instance, David Kennedy’s International Legal Structures.3 What is this
book about? What does it try to say? That you can think of international law as a
canon of rhetorical moves? That the discourse of substance always refers us back to
the discourses of process and sources? That legal aporia is ineradicable and that it is
preciselybecauseof this that international lawhasmanaged to retain its importance
in modern politics? Some books are just impossible to sum up. Certainly, that does
∗ School of Law, University of Glasgow.
1. U. Eco, Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyperreality (1998), 221.
2. Ibid.
3. David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (1987), 195–8.
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not make them any less remarkable, pleasant, or enlightening – far from it – but it
deﬁnitely makes them very difﬁcult to review.
Truth be told, however, I do not know in which category the two volumes I
am supposed to review here belong.4 On the one hand, Critical Beings5 and Law,
Justice, and Power6 are, of course, very intelligent books. Reading them without
‘applying yourself to a gloss’ is almost certainly impossible: ‘a mutual appetency
of the universal and the particular’ (Critical Beings, p. xi (Fitzpatrick and Tuitt)). is
not howmost people talk of the nation-state. On the other hand, they are also very
difﬁcult books to try to pin down. Twenty-ﬁve essays written by 24 contributors,
only nine of whom are lawyers – how often do you come across law books that
take interdisciplinarity that seriously? Five hundred pages of elaborate polemic,
cerebral, complex, and intense, unafraid to offend or raise awkward questions, and
conceiving its subject-matter under the rubrics of ‘preventive counter-revolution’
and ‘the misery of the Untermenschen’ (Law, Justice, and Power, p. 2 (Cheng)) – how
often do you get to pass judgments about texts that speak that conﬁdently and in
that kind of voice?
Then again, perhaps, such ambivalence is not really a problem. One of the three
main themes that constitute the common intellectual space covered by these two
volumes is marked by the name of Jacques Derrida. Derrida’s most enduring philo-
sophical legacy today, certainly, is the theory that all binary oppositions are essen-
tially unstable. Or, to put it slightly differently, however convincing they may look
at ﬁrst, most dichotomies do not actually work if you start taking them seriously.
Let me explain this in a bit more detail.
To start with, one does not have to be a Derridean to recognize that the whole
modernWestern culture is essentially grounded in a binaristic sensibility. One can
be a Platonic and still accept the same idea. Nature versus nurture, subject versus
object, reason versuswill, truth versus power, lordship versus servitude –whichever
way you look at the world, if you look at it throughWestern eyes, it always comes
out as an endless chain of binary oppositions. The West just likes that kind of
thing.7 The same, of course, holds true for Western law: ‘The more sophisticated
a person’s legal thinking, regardless of her political stance, the more likely she is
to believe that all issues within a doctrinal ﬁeld reduce to a single dilemma of the
4. That they are at least intended to belong in the same category seems to be beyond doubt: both books are
explicitly identiﬁed as contributions to the same line of juristic debate. Critical Beings is part of the ‘Law,
Justice and Power’ series edited by Austin Sarat. Law, Justice, and Power, as the title indicates, is directly
inspired by the same series. See Law, Justice, and Power, 17.
5. Critical Beings consists of 11 essays organized in three parts – ‘introversion’, ‘extraversion’, and ‘formation’
– and an introduction. The ﬁrst part focuses on the relationship between the concepts of nationhood and
refugeehoodandthecorrespondinglegal regimes.Thesecondpartattemptstoset theframeworkfor thestudy
of theuniversal dimensionof the international and its relationshipwith theparticularity of nationhood. The
third part seeks to review the various ways in which the new hybrid subjects whose subjectivity is regularly
overlooked in the traditional accounts of the global juridical order are constituted.
6. Law, Justice, and Power consists of an introduction and 14 essays organized in six parts: ‘the “newworld order”
between state sovereignty and human rights’, ‘colonialism and the globalization of western law’, ‘legal
pluralism and beyond’, ‘new ethical and philosophical turns in legal theory’, ‘the “inhuman” dimension of
law: poststructuralist assessments’, and ‘psychoanalysis: justice outside the “limits” of the law’. Given the
incredible diversity of the essays, it may have made sense to divide the volume even further.
7. FurtheronDerrida’s takeonbinarisms, seeG.Gutting,FrenchPhilosophy in theTwentiethCentury (2001), 293–4.
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degree of collective as opposed to individual self-determination’,8 or, slightly more
familiarly, ‘The dynamics of international legal argument . . . lies behind such dicho-
tomies as “positivism”/“naturalism”, “consent”/“justice”, “autonomy”/“community”,
“process”/ “rule”, etc’.9
Now, what Derrida had to say about all of this was basically as follows. First, he
said, every binary opposition, however stable it may seem at ﬁrst, if you look at it
hard enough, sooner or later is going to reveal its fundamental instability. Nature
always slides intonurture, lordship always transforms into slavery, truthblends into
power, exceptions become the rule, positivism turns into a version of naturalism,
and so on.Whydoes this happen? The answer, saidDerrida, is very simple. No entity
can ever keep at bay that analytical antithesis on whose ontological isolation its
identity depends. Or, to put it slightly less abstractly, every Self carries within it an
ineradicable trace of its external Other, which is to say that the Other is never really
external and, moreover, never really an Other.
The implications of these observations, as soon as Derrida formulated them,
needless to say, were enormous. Post-Derrida there are left now no real masters
or slaves, no reason or will, no separation between culture and nature, truth and
power, books for commentators and books for admirers, legalism and politicking.
Instead, there is only one eternal, all-encompassinghaze of sparkly oscillation called
diffe´rance and everything that wemay feel about it.
All ofwhichnowbringsus to fourbasicquestions. First,what isdiffe´rance?Second,
how is what Derrida says in any sense different from the old cliche´ that ‘everything
is subjective, anyway’? Third, what does this have to do with the two volumes in
question? And, fourth, how is it at all relevant for international law? Four questions,
one justiﬁcation, two lines of enquiry. Before I try to explore either of them,however,
letmetakeashortdetourandentera fewremarksaboutcanons, law,anddisciplinary
renewals.
2. POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW SCHOLARSHIP
The ﬁrst tenet of classical structuralism states that every activity always proceeds
according to a certain canon, that is, a set of constitutive norms and procedures
through the totality of which the ideal model of the given activity is practically
established, changed, and enacted. Needless to say, to endorse this idea does not
necessarily presuppose the belief that every act always embodies only one canon –
obviously, someactsare internallycontradictory (clashofcanons),whileothershave
several dimensions of functionality (overlapping of canons) – or that canons exist
independently of the corresponding practices or that they are transcendental, self-
sufﬁcient, universal, and ahistorical. Not at all.What it does presuppose, however, is
the belief that, however you go about it, whatever you do, whichever way you turn,
8. Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries’, (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 205, 213.
9. M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, (1990) 1 EJIL 4, 8.
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you always workwithin some kind of canon. Even canon-bashing, come to think of
it, has its basic rules and procedures.
The fact that canons are so ubiquitous naturally makes them a very important
psychological tool. To put it simply, canons command emotional capital. The closer
youfollowtheestablishedcanon, themorecomfortable, even ifbored,youraudience
is going to feel. The further you step away from it, conversely, themore uneasy their
experience will become, the less likely they are to remain indifferent to your acts.
Approaching our two volumes against this background, then, it seems rather
self-evident that themain reasonwhy they appear to be so difﬁcult to read andwrite
about from the perspective of an international lawyer is that each, in its own way,
seemstodefysomeof themost fundamentalcanonsof international lawscholarship.
To start with, not only do they both advocate a rather wide-ranging renewal of
international law as a discipline, but they also talk of it as if it were something
almost unreservedly good.No self-respecting international lawyer inhis rightmind,
however, will ever accept that kind of ethics in good faith. International lawyers
hate disciplinary renewals.
Perhaps this is a sign that the ‘profession’ has ﬁnally developed some kind of a
collective unconscious – who knows? – every disciplinary renewal in international
lawoverthelasthundredyearsorsohas invariablyendedinalarge-scaleprofessional
crisis,whichprobablycouldbeexplainedbythe fact thatmost international lawyers,
historically, have been idealists by creed, and idealists, as a rule, tend to be too thin-
skinned to survive disciplinary ruptures unscathed.
Or maybe it has something to do with the job market: there are simply too few
real jobs in theﬁeldof international law, even today.Most international lawyers over
the course of the last century and a half have been academics. Academics are not
particularly well known for their ability to reinvent a career midway through the
ﬂight. They are, in this sense, all slaves of methodological fashions. Every time
the discipline sheds its skin, then, the bulk of the profession risks ending up on
the street, ﬁguratively or literally. Think of what happened to Kelsenians and their
employmentpatterns after the SecondWorldWar,whenpure theory fell fromgrace,
or Tunkin’s school, for that matter, after the disintegration of the USSR.
Feeling bad about disciplinary renewals, however, is no more a central part of
what makes someone a good international lawyer than feeling good about them
ought to be a central part of whatmakes someone a good international law student.
Think again: there are too few real jobs in the ﬁeld, even today. The house of
international lawisovercrowded.Unless theoldguardwiththeiroldwaysandhabits
are completely squeezed out, the new guard will have no room to take as their own.
What better way to go about securing a job, then, thanwith a disciplinary renewal?
Still, evendisciplinary renewals areknown to followcertain rules. The renewalist
scholarship in international law, like all other lines of discourse, has its own aes-
thetics, customs, and master plots,10 and the two volumes under review appear to
observe them only half-heartedly.
10. See further David Kennedy, ‘A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, (1994) 4 Transnational
Law and Contemporary Problems 329, 358–61.
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Ideologically, the main function of Critical Beings and Law, Justice, and Power as
piecesofscholarlydiscourseseemstobetocreatesomekindofaworkingplatformfor
the formulation of a newwave of theoretical interventions. The starting ‘base-camp’
for the interventions appears tobe the classical canonof Frenchpoststructuralism;11
the targeted domain in question, the second-oldest debate in jurisprudence: ‘what
should legal analysis become?; the suggested point of ﬁrst entry, the newly formed
discourse on ‘law and globalization’.12
Every renewalist project is normally expected to proceed according to a certain
sequence. First, it is supposed to engage in basic self-promotion and proselytization.
The ideological project outlined by our two books – let us call it, for the sake of
expediency, ‘legal poststructuralism’ – at this point seems to proceedmore or less in
line with the established practice. The most accessible (in discursive terms) essays,
even though they are not placed at the beginning of each collection, adopt exactly
the kind of tone onewould usually expect from someone trying to popularize his or
her lineofproducts. Speakingat this levelof itsorganization, legalpoststructuralism
callson its audiences to ‘try to transcendreference to “law”and“the law”asa singular
phenomenon and treat [it, rather,] as a social artifact’ (Law, Justice, and Power, p. 159
(Brigham)). The main justiﬁcation for doing this is cited as follows: (i) all legal
theories that do not practise such a kind of transcendence are known to end up
‘hypothesiz[ing] a state of nature in order to justify or explain the legitimacy of
institutionalized law’; (ii) such hypotheses, however, always lead, in one way or
another, to glossing over the intrinsic ambivalences of the traditional concept of
the nation-state by, for instance, overlooking the existence of ‘stateless peoples, and
refugees, and changing national borders’ (Critical Beings, p. 4 (Stauffer)); and (iii) all
this,ofcourse, ismorallywrongandintellectuallydishonestandcancause innocents
to suffer.
As soon as the initial message is received and processed, the tenor of the re-
newalist discourse is expected to change from that of the annunciation to that of an
11. For a good introductory overview of poststructuralism, see further C. Belsey, Poststructuralism: A Very Short
Introduction (2002). The irony here, of course, is that the poststructuralist ‘classics’ themselves (Derrida,
Lacan, etc.) seem to have thought it quite revolting to fetishize any modality of action or knowledge and to
construct on this basis any sort of canon or dogma. Then again, maybe that is the reasonwhy they are called
the classics. Marx, after all, was not a Marxist either.
12. I was not sure at the beginning whether it was fair to include both books under the same heading of
poststructuralist scholarship. In the end, I decided that it was, on the understanding that poststructuralism,
like all other intellectual traditions, has different faces andmanifestations. Thus, whereCritical Beings seems
to come across as a rather conscious attempt to provide a poststructuralist exegesis of law and globalization,
Law, Justice, and Power appears to bemore of an (unintended?) illustrationofwhat such exegesesmaybecome
if the logic of poststructuralization is left to take shape on its own. Moreover, while the poststructuralist
aspirations of Critical Beings are clearly detectable at almost every level of its substantive dimension, from
the concrete theses advanced in the individual essays to the general message of the book as a whole –
but not, interestingly, in the form of its internal organization, which continues to remain more or less
orthodox, or its take on its own imputed subjectivity (more on this later) – the individual essays comprising
Law, Justice, and Power do not, as a rule, appear self-consciously poststructuralist, either in aspiration or in
execution, even though the book as a whole exhibits all the classic symptoms of poststructuralization: the
text – the materiality comprised by the 14 essays – incessantly turns against its own self-image, outlined
in the introductory section; the metanarrativist aspirations of the editor are honoured far more in breach
than in observance; the substantive contents of thewriting constantly break free from the formal structures
imposed on it by the authors; themultiplicity of interpretations invited by the conjunction ofmutually not
comparable essays repeatedly evokes the image of a semantic inundation, and so forth.
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illustration. The audiences must be invited to witness the new teaching in action,
rather than just listen and read about its alleged miracles and promises. The way
in which legal poststructuralism goes about this task again seems to be rather tra-
ditional. The essays of the second tier of complexity explicitly identify themselves
as works in ‘applied theory’, thus inviting the reader to watch and learn the new
‘truth’ by example. Take for instance the refugee/migrant theme uniting the two
volumes: ‘This chapter combines sociocultural theory, experience (life historical
accounts/cultural memory), and action/praxis (art forms) to explore and better un-
derstand the experiences of being in exile, a refugee, an asylum seeker in the United
Kingdom between the twentieth and twenty-ﬁrst centuries’ (Law, Justice, and Power,
p. 70 (O’Neill)). ‘This chapter concerns the ways in which the refugee is symbol-
ized in contemporary political theory, as exempliﬁed by the works of Agamben,
Malkki and Xenos . . . . Above all, I am concerned with those works that assert that
the refugee condition is politically productive of a new political consciousness able
to challenge thenexusof state, territory and identity’ (Critical Beings, p. 37 (Tuitt)). ‘In
this chapter, I want to shift from the view of the immigration state as one involved
in the sovereign activity of “defending” a territorial “inside” through the exercise
of exclusion and deportation powers. This is a view that animates, albeit in very
different registers, thework of Sassen, Smith and the “plenary power doctrine” ofUS
constitutional law . . . . Instead, I want to introduce a sharply different view, that of a
state driven by the impulse to eject the disenfranchised elements of its own “inside”
by exploiting the fortuities of the legal structures available to it.’ (Critical Beings,
p. 184 (Parker)).
Only after the illustrative stage is duly completed can the renewalist discourse
begin to allow its audiences to peek into its ‘internal proceedings’ and listen in on
the ‘private’ discussions of its leaders through whose bargains and disagreements
the course of its ideological development is in fact determined. Anyone who has
a basic understanding of sociology will already know that it is in the ‘[s]truggle
among individuals and groups over resources – institutional resources, prestige, the
resources of perceived plausibility, disciplinary hegemony – and the processes by
which these resources are in turnallocated’ that the ‘explanations for thedominance
of some ideasat sometimesand for transformations in thedisciplinaryvocabulary’13
must be sought, but it is still part of the established canon that, as far as possible, one
must never acknowledge as much about one’s own discourse, for that is supposed
to be the knowledge of the initiates, and the lay should never be allowed to reach it
easily.
It is part of the renewalist canon, in other words, that a renewalist project will
never proceed successfully if it starts to reveal to the outside world all its internal
splitsbeforeit takestheopportunitytoestablishitself inthebestpossiblelight.Trans-
ferring to the context of contemporary international law scholarship, achieving this
condition for an international lawyer essentially means presenting the proposed
renewal as the most effective solution to the discipline’s eternal predicament,
13. David Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats Itself: Thinking against the Box’, (2000) 32 New York University
Journal of International Law and Politics 335, 423.
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namely, how can international law be made practically relevant while retaining
its discursive distinctness from international politics? Given the discipline’s es-
tablished dogma and the unmistakably natural-law ﬂavour of the predicament’s
formulation, to achieve this effect, it appears, the solutionmust always come across
as if it were derived from the objective nature of the social reality or the reason itself.
Probably this has something to dowith the absence of a centralized political process
in the international arena and the enormous size of stakes disposed by international
law. In any event, international lawyers’ ﬁxation with objectivity borders on patho-
logical, and, if we look at the history of international law’s disciplinary renewals
in the last hundred years, every successful project from League institutionalism to
UNpragmatism to the transnational-legal-process school has shamelessly taken ad-
vantageof this.Whocares that the social realitymay suggest several different things
about its nature, all of which will look equally objective to an outside observer, or
that the reason does not itself prescribe what the international standards on the
utilization of the deep-seabed resources should be – if youwant your renewalism to
be accepted, this is the way to go.
The more divided the leaders of the new movement appear to be, the less con-
vincing they look when they try to persuade the rest of the profession that their
renewalistproject isobjectively justiﬁedand that their teaching isnot, therefore, just
an ideological construct. Seen against this background, the ﬁrst political paradox
of legal poststructuralism is that, on the one hand, it still appears to think of itself
as a project of disciplinary renewal that has long been overdue, while, on the other
hand, it immediately admits to anyone who cares to read its introductions, that not
only is it completely fragmented, constantly turned against itself, and utterly proud
of it, but that it also does not believe in objective reason and, moreover, is not sure if
it can provide that kind of solution which its audience expects.
The ink had not yet dried on the passage revealing its basic intellectual afﬁnity
with the scholarly projects led byGiorgioAgamben andMichaelHardt andAntonio
Negri, andCritical Beings already starts charging against those whom, in any reason-
able, pragmatic assessment, one should have considered to be its main, if not only,
ideological allies (Critical Beings, p. xii). Then again, for poststructuralism this may
be the most natural thing to do. Admitting internal fragmentations, as far as the
poststructuralist aesthetics is concerned, is perhaps the best rhetorical tactic ever.
‘We see our engagement as . . . concernedmorewith a dynamic of formation than
with a peremptory resolution’, declare the editors of Critical Beings. The resulting
‘emphasis on unsettlement and ambivalence . . . set[s us] dramatically against [all
the] recent attempts to delineate a new global or quasi-universal subjectivity and to
connect this to a juridical order’ (ibid.).What legal poststructuralism seeks to do, in
other words, is to offer not a reinvention of the international law discipline around
a new set of truths and dogma, but to overthrow the discipline of international law
as such. Not a replacement, that is, of Westphalia or ‘transgovernmentalism’ with
another ideological closure, but an end to closuring as a practice.
To be sure, none of this prevents legal poststructuralism from continuing to is-
sue statements like ‘[this kind of] shift in ethics, to one of responsibility prior to
universality, is not opposed to the rule of law, or indeed to the realm of legal insti-
tutions’ (LJP, 187, Gibbs), but it does force it to acknowledge the need to ‘reinterpret
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 02 Apr 2012 IP address: 130.209.6.42
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[the concepts of] law and norms’ (ibid.). Hence the tremendous density of the en-
suing intellectual operations and the continuous quest to overcome the anxieties
of the liberal political theory: ‘but what if law (like any economic, social, or moral
structure) is indeterminate?What if law is not an objective and neutral representat-
ive of something (legislative will, community interest) beyond itself? This is what
political theory considers a scandal. But it need not be’ (Law, Justice, and Power’ p. 61
(Koskenniemi)). Perhaps, ‘in its indeterminatebeing, law [could] provide . . . thepath
from [private] morality to [public] justice’ (p. 62) and thus save us all. Or, perhaps –
one is immediately pushed to respond – by pointing out the precarious character
of law as a discipline, by bringing home the idea that not only the formal legal
institutions themselves, but also the legal concepts and the legal theories behind
them, are nothing but artefacts – a task that is, admittedly, as emotionally costly as
it is intellectually taxing – legal poststructuralism restores to the surface not only
that traditionally forgotten ‘moment of decision that underlies any sedimented set
of social relations’ but also its twin axiom – whose memory, alas, is far too often
suppressed by thewould-be deconstructionists – that ‘from the fact that there is the
impossibility of ultimate closure . . . , it does not [necessarily] follow that there is an
ethical imperative to “cultivate” that openness or even less to be . . . committed to a
democratic society’14 and thus acknowledge, however brieﬂy, that liberalism’s fears
of poststructuralism are not perhaps all irrational andmisplaced.
There is nothing inherently emancipatory or progressive about poststructuraliz-
ation, just as there is nothing inherently oppressive or reactionary about structures
and reiﬁcations. Doctrinal formalism does not always work against the weak and
the oppressed.15 The Westphalian conception of sovereignty does not always con-
tradict the aspirations of human dignity. The reiﬁcations imposed by the liberal
theory of the nation-state do not always and necessarily make things worse for the
downtrodden.16 Of course, this is not the casewhenwe should invoke themetaphor
of the coin, which, as the conventional wisdom holds, always has its two sides. The
logic of the relationship between structures and emancipation looks rather more
like thatof thebuttered toast released ina free fall: although ithasmore thanoneside
too, the toast, as everyone knows, always lands buttered side down. Formalism does,
as a rule, harm the weakmore than it harms the strong. The doctrine of sovereignty
does, as a rule, work against the interests of the refugees and the downtroddenmore
than it works for them. But for a discourse that is so passionatelywedded to the goal
of anti-reiﬁcation, it must be at least questionable to exhibit such an unequivocal
admiration for epistemological openness, unless, of course, that is just a tactical ruse.
Traditionally, poststructuralism’smain aspiration has been to struggle against all
forms of reiﬁcation and hypostatization, that is, any kind of substantialization of
meaning or presence. It was Julia Kristeva, incidentally one of the 14 contributors to
14. E. Laclau, Emancipation(s) (1996), 77–8.
15. Indeed, as Koskenniemi correctly observes, ‘if the law is indeterminate, then there is nothing that may
obstruct or realize any purposes’ (Law, Justice, and Power, 60).
16. There is a powerful tradition of postcolonial criticism resisting unbridled enthusiasm for anti-statism. See,
e.g., Sundhya Pahuja’s essay inCritical Beings, 161–79. See also B. S. Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today:
an Imperial Global State in theMaking’, (2004) 15 EJIL 1.
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Law, Justice, and Power, who originally gave, perhaps, themost systematic expression
to this aspiration ‘proposing to replace the older metaphysical notions of literary
form with that of the text as a self-generating mechanism, as a perpetual process
of textual production’. Any attempt to repress such understanding of literature, in
that view of things, had to be interpreted as the sign of ‘a fear of the process of [the]
inﬁnite relay of meaning from signiﬁer to signiﬁed’, the same kind of fear that had
earlier been described by existentialists as the fear of the human condition, the fear
which, once it strikes, makes people ‘unable to live within [the] pure temporality of
difference and [needing] ultimately [to] have recourse to some comforting doctrine
of a transcendental signiﬁed at whatever level, whether it be that of God, political
authority, machismo, the literary work, or simply meaning itself’.17 The poisonous
inﬂuence of pervasive alienation and wicked interpellation apart, all hypostatiza-
tions are, the argument ran, a symptomof thehypostatizer’s basic anxiety about life.
People are afraid of time because it bringswith itself not only the promise of change
but also the threat of death. The love for essences and hypostases, thus, is the ﬁrst
mask of the fear of death.
Seenformthisperspective,poststructuralismeffectivelycomesoutas justanother
variation of the old existentialist tradition, with the crucial difference that where
existentialism perceived the fear of indeterminacy as something to be confronted
and overcome, poststructuralism takes it as something to be avoided at all costs,
thus, in a deeply ironic twist on Roosevelt’s felicitous phrase, creating its own object
of fear and, with it, inevitably, its own set of hypostases. By relentlessly struggling
against all forms of disciplinary dogma, poststructuralism, brought to its logical
conclusion, ends up producing a dogma of its own. Attempting to escape from the
‘cretinism’ of formalism it slips into the trap of ‘romanticizing’ anti-formalism and
interdisciplinarism.18 Then again, perhaps, it is not impossible to see in this the
surest sign of poststructuralism’s own poststructuralization, for, after all, what can
be more poststructuralist than when a text begin to turn against itself, ridiculing
the sovereign design created for it by its authors?
Or maybe in the end it all boils down to the same old observation: there is a very
thin line between pragmatism and opportunism, and far more often than not the
two simply cannot be told apart. By melting the rigid structures of dogma, post-
structuralism, on the one hand, rewards every reformistmovementwith a powerful
know-howof unorthodox politics and, on the other hand, undermines every radical
project in its sight whose performance requires time, planning, and discipline, by
immediately turning all its anti-dogmatic arsenal against it. By romanticizing the
practice of endless questioning and denouncing the act of closure as such, does
poststructuralism not risk becoming just another strand of intellectual anarcho-
terrorismwhose only real achievement is to inoculate the EstablishedOrder against
any effective challenges from the left? Neither book under review seems to show
much awareness of this possibility,19 which inevitably leads one towonder: is it just
17. F. Jameson, The Prison-House of Language (1972), 182.
18. G. Luka´cs,History and Class Consciousness (1990), 270.
19. There are, however, some occasional exceptions. See, e.g., Sundhya Pahuja’s essay in Critical Beings, 161–79.
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a caseofnaivetyorutter cynicismto invest thatmuch trust inpoststructuralization?
Is one simply mistaken or does one necessarily act in bad faith when one begins to
imply that the oppressive regimes sustaining global injustices will dissolve as soon
as ‘everyone’ learns that all binary structures are unstable, that law can be indeterm-
inate, that the opposition between reason andwill is ﬂawed, and that, therefore, it is
perfectly ﬁne that this awareness may also serve to undermine every emancipatory
projecthitherto formulatedbetter thanany reactionary ideology?Or, better still, can
knowledge ever set the world free on its own and what happens if that knowledge
is the knowledge about diffe´rance?
3. STRUCTURES, DIFFE´RANCE, AND WHAT COMES AFTER
What is diffe´rance? FollowingDerrida’s own lead, no self-respectingDerridean, prob-
ably, will ever consent to answering this question deﬁnitively.20 Where deﬁnitions
do not work, however, as a learned jurist has remarked, descriptions can still some-
times do the trick.21
One way to solve the riddle of diffe´rance, consequently, is to describe it as the
synchronic aspect of that phenomenonwhose diachronic aspect is (supposed to be)
embodied in thematerial-dialecticalnotionofBecoming. Seen fromthisperspective,
where the latter stands for the actual evolution of Substance, the former, one could
say, marks the ontological limits of this evolution’s theoretical potentiality, or, in
other words, serves as the marker of its potentia.22
Another way of addressing the issue is to explore diffe´rance’s functional signiﬁc-
ance in the context of the classical structuralist dogma.
Meaning, teaches classical structuralism, is, essentially, the effect not of a natural
link existing between a constructed sign and the corresponding physical object
existing in the outside world, but of a structural system of differentiation posited
by the given frame of reference. We know what a ‘coffee cup’ means, for instance,
not because we know which exact physical object corresponds to this term, but
because we know how it relates to all other terms with which it is discursively
connected: ‘mug’, ‘carafe’, ‘soup bowl’, ‘champagne glass’, and so on. Knowledge, to
put it differently, is derived not from the study of some non-discursive reality but
fromtheintra-discursiverelationsoccurringbetweenvariousconceptualconstructs.
The ﬁrst structuralist thinker in modern legal history (even if he did not know it)
was, perhaps, Hohfeld.23
All intra-discursive relations, meanwhile, are ineradicably systemic in nature,
and the most fundamental system of relations, it seems, is that which is based on
the quadrangle constituted by the two types of logical negation: contradiction and
opposition. Naturally, there also exist many other relational systems – familial,
20. For a rather concise explanation, see P. Schlag, ‘“Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi”: The Politics of Form and the
Domestication of Deconstruction’, (1990) 11 Cardozo Law Review 1631.
21. See B. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (1924), 24. Cf. K. Llewellyn, ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step’,
(1930) 30 Columbia Law Review 431, 432.
22. Cf. Jameson, supra note 17, at 187.
23. See, e.g., W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1919).
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hierarchical, associational, and so forth – but all concepts withwhich theywork are
ultimately established on the basis of this fundamental structure.
A
– non-A – A
non-A
As soon as we try to conceptualize an entity ‘A’ we also inevitably create some
imaginative space for the conceptual formation of its contradictory ‘non-A’ and its
contrary ‘–A’ as well as the latter’s contradictory ‘–non-A’.24 Or, to use a slightly
more familiar example, we cannot properly conceptualize the idea of ‘legal’ until
our discourse simultaneously creates room for the ontological recognition of ‘non-
legal’, ‘illegal’, and, for lack of a better word, ‘alegal’, that is, ‘undiscussible in terms
of legality’, i.e. ‘lying completely outside that discursive domain in which it makes
sense to talk of things in terms of their legality or illegality’. The created room,
of course, does not ever need actually to be ﬁlled – the structural positions can
remain discursively unused in practice. What matters in the ﬁnal analysis is that
they exist and are ﬁt for discursive utilization – which is why in practice it often
happens that the discursive process relies only on the contradictional mechanism
(hence thehabit of creatingbinary oppositions), leaving theoppositional possibility
unexplored. Consider, as an illustration, Anzilotti’s classic excursus in the Customs
Regime case:25 to explain themeaning of ‘independence’, Anzilotti had to discuss its
relationship with its contradictory (‘dependence’), but never its relationship with
its (still nameless) contrary.
To understand the functional signiﬁcance of diffe´rance in the context of this intel-
lectual tradition, consider the concepts that represent the state of simple absence,
i.e. ‘non-A’ and ‘non-legal’. The only reason why in practice our discourses grant
such concepts any ontological recognition, says classical structuralism, is because
somewhere beyond themwe also imagine the existence of their corresponding con-
tradictories that represent the state of simple presence (in our case, ‘A’ and ‘legal’).
Without these logical negations that comprise their conceptual exteriors andmark
the limits of their ontological identity, we cannot make any practical sense of such
concepts. Put differently, in its very existence every concept that represents simple
absence is always permeated (contaminated) with the traces of that concept which
represents simple presence. (How do you know that something lacks unless you
knowwhat it would be likewhen that something is present?) In their own turn, the
concepts that represent simplepresence are similarly inconceivablewithout a struc-
tural reference to the concepts that represent simple absence. (How do you know
there is something unless you can imagine a condition in which that something
lacks?)
24. Further on this seeA. J. Greimas and F. Rastier, ‘The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints’, (1968) 41Yale French
Studies 86; Jameson, supra note 17, 163–8. See also generally A.-J. Greimas, Se´mantique Structurale (1966).
25. (1931) PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 41.
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The moment we arrive at this point, says Derrida, two conclusions invite them-
selves to be made.
First, sinceabsence is logicallydependentonpresenceandpresence is logicallyde-
pendent on absence, it follows that neither presence nor absence can be deﬁnitively
identiﬁed as ontologically primary vis-a`-vis one another, which means that the
‘discovery’ of the ﬁrst point of contamination, that is, the original source, has to be
suspended and deferred. Second, if everything necessarily contains in itself a trace
of its logical outside – if all Selves, that is, are dependent in the establishment of
their ontological identity on their Others – it follows that every conceptual space
marked by a pair of opposites – presence vs. absence, legal vs. illegal, dependence
vs. independence – is nothing but a temporary effect representing the contingent
conﬂuence of such traces, which is to say that the only thing that really exists is
the differentiation of the interdependent but mutually irreducible contaminations;
everything else is just a temporary manifestation of its realization. Put the two
conclusions together, and the resultant amalgam – the condition of a perpetual
differentiation suspended in the stateofperpetualdeferralof thequestionof itsorigin–
is what makes up diffe´rance.26
A question arises now. What challenges does the notion of diffe´rance pose to the
project of the international rule of law? The answer, it seems, is not as simple as it
may appear at ﬁrst.
First, the notion of diffe´rance rance radically destabilizes the traditional theory of
legal interpretation. To refer back to an earlier observation, the theory of diffe´rance
proclaims that there are no easy or difﬁcult texts to review, which is basically to say:
it is pointless to invest either in reﬂective commentaries or in ﬁrst-hand reading.
Texts are always irreducible to anything other than themselves. No interpretation
can ever exhaust the discursive richness of any text. Or, in other words, it is never
superﬂuous to read the text itself. That said, no act of reading is ever completely
pure of gloss and reformulation, i.e. interpretation. Furthermore, no act of reading
is ever like any other. Reading the text itself, therefore, is not going to produce the
same results every time it is attempted. Moreover, it is not even going to produce
results of the same quality. Put differently, reading the text itself is not necessarily
better or more progressive than reading its reviews or not reading anything at all.
(Guess nowwhere that leaves Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.)
Second, it introducesintotheself-consciousnessoftheinternationallawdiscourse
a pervasive awareness of its ontological instability. If diffe´rance is all there ever
has to be, then, ontologically speaking, all structural constructs are by deﬁnition
contingent. Naturally, this is not to say that they are, therefore, also contingent
historically or that they are ontologically epiphenomenal or illusory or anything
like that. They are simply not part in any way or manner of the sufﬁcient reason
(in the Leibnizian sense of the term), that is, there is nothing inherent in any
single structural construct that makes its existence ontologically necessary. Put
differently, all structural constructs are ontologically aleatory: none of them had
to be or take the form or valence it has today. The fact that they nevertheless
26. On diffe´rance, see further J. Derrida,Margins of Philosophy (1982), 1–28. Cf. Jameson, supra note 17, at 173–86.
See also Sarah Kyambi’s essay in Critical Beings at 19–36.
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did can, consequently, be explained only in terms of their immediate historical
contexts, that is, the basic political struggle between concrete social groups and
social formations that surrounds their creation, alteration, andmaintenance.27 Seen
from this perspective, everything that exists in our discursive universe, including
the discourse of international law, is effectively the product of our particular history
and not of any transcendental domain, such as, for instance, universal justice, the
nature of the international community, or the basic principles of reason. History, in
its turn, as everyhistorian isperfectly aware, is a thing that couldhavealways turned
out in a completely different way.We could as easily have lived in a world in which
the international legal argumentwasnot split betweenapologyandutopia28 and the
substantivediscourseof international legalitydidnothave to resolve its ambiguities
by constantly referring us back to the discourses of process and sources.29
That said – and this is the third point – precarious as the ontological status of
the individual structural constructs may be, structuration itself, as an abstract con-
dition and as a general phenomenon, is functionally unavoidable. The reasons for
this are essentially twofold. First, even in an utterly poststructuralized context, all
epistemology is always structuralist incharacter: the structuralist observationabout
knowledge being the product of the logical operations of contradiction and oppos-
ition is not only not disproved by the notion of diffe´rance, but is in fact reinforced
by it. Second, even in a radically poststructuralizing discourse, there will always
have to be some kind of basic structural framework, if only because each discourse
is essentially a practice of signs, and all signs, even the most primitive ones, are by
deﬁnition structural constructs.30
27. The moment poststructuralism proclaimed the theory of diffe´rance and thus suggested that structural con-
structs lacked anymetaphysical foundations, the phenomenon of structuration had to receive a new theor-
etical explanation. The most convincing attempt, historically, came in the form of the theory of the master
signiﬁer. According to it, some parts of the structural construct, even though they are themselves deprived
of any given (i.e. externally provided) content of their own, in practice can serve as the content-endowing
points for the rest of the construct. For this to happen, all other parts of the structural construct would have
to be organized in such away as to acquire theirmeaning through their relation to these nodal points. Thus,
even though the ontological foundations of the construct as a whole would stay completely precarious,
its structural image would continue to remain more or less stable. The next step in the development of
poststructuralist thought came when the theory of the master signiﬁer was combined with the Gramscian
theory of hegemony. The concept of hegemony in the Gramscian tradition basically refers to that type of
situation where a limited historical particularity attempts to aggrandize for itself the position of a limitless
ontological universality: a particular class acts in the name of thewhole society (class hegemony), a particu-
lar culture assumes knowledge of the universal values (hegemony as cultural imperialism), a dictator’s will
masquerades as a democratic decision (hegemony as dictatorship), etc. The fruitfulness of the ideological
union between the two theories became apparentwhen the poststructuralist philosophy started reformulat-
ing the concept of the hegemonic struggle as that type of struggle whose ultimate political prize consists in
securing privileged access to the content-plane of the master signiﬁer. Hegemony, on this reading of events,
is the regime of controlling the ideological substance of the relevant set ofmaster signiﬁers: whoever gets to
deﬁne themeaning of themaster signiﬁer decides themood anddirection of the rest of the given discourse at
whose structural centre it rests. Thus,where the theoryof themaster signiﬁer explainshowthephenomenon
of structuration works in abstracto, the theory of hegemony explains how the master signiﬁers are actually
selected and used in practice. For further elaboration, see, e.g., E. Laclau andC.Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy (2nd edn, 2001).
28. See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (1989).
29. See Kennedy, supra note 3.
30. Compare this with Derrida’s own observation that ‘The foundations of the metaphysic of presence have
been shaken by means of the concept of a sign. But as soon as one attempts to show . . . that there is no
transcendental or privileged signiﬁed and that at that point the ﬁeld or play of signiﬁcation knows no limit,
then one ought – but this is exactly what one cannot do – to refuse the very concept and word sign. For the
signiﬁcation “sign” has always been understood and determined in its meaning as a sign-of, as a signiﬁer
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Needless to say, the double thesis that (i) structuration as a phenomenon is
effectively inevitable, and (ii) all structures are essentiallywebs of logical negations,
raises a number of very important implications for international law as a political
project.
First, it raises the possibility that the age-old aspiration of making international
law universal, that is, turning it into the law of the all-humanity,31 has to be recog-
nized as completely unrealizable. Insofar as all presence is always permeated with
absence, and all entities, real or conceptual, require in their constitution a certain
boundary of exclusion beyond which they locate their constitutive outsides and
thus derive a sense of their identity, the view that international law could ever be-
come all-inclusive appears to be analytically unsustainable. Consider the following
argument. If international law is a social project – and all legal orders, of course,
are social projects by deﬁnition – then, to be practically realizable, it must always
require the effective presence of some global subjectivity, call it a ‘family of nations’,
an ‘international community’, or ‘the civilized world’. Without a global juridical
‘subject’, there can be no global juridical order. In order to develop a practical sense
of its subjectivity, however, every social agent in question, whatever its degree of
self-consciousness, must always retain a certain awareness of its ontological incom-
pleteness. There must always, in other words, remain a certain incommensurable
Other outside the structural ambit of its selfhood against which it can produce
the knowledge of its own existence, construct its raison d’eˆtre, and develop its ideal
self-image. Without negating that perceived Other, the agent cannot discover the
motivation for its self-becoming and the organizing logic for its self-identiﬁcation.
Being the basis subjectivity of a global juridical order, therefore, the community
of international law, in order to realize the project of international law in practice,
must always retain an ontological awareness of the global Other. Or, in otherwords,
to the extent to which there has to be created a domain of international legality,
theremust also be (simultaneously) created a corresponding class of global outlaws.
The ‘rogue states’, barbarians, hostes humanis generes, illegalmigrants, the enemies of
the free world – the names may change, but the basic principle always remains the
same: international law is impossible without a global caste of international refuse´s.
Law and exclusion walk hand in hand. Global law requires global exclusion.
Given that no subjectivity can be non-exclusive, moreover, it also follows that
to the extent to which international law strives to become or present itself as the
law of the all-humanity, it necessarily becomes a hegemonic enterprise.32 That said,
pointing back to, a signiﬁed, as a signiﬁer different from its signiﬁed. If now we erase the radical difference
between the signiﬁer and signiﬁed, then we ought to abandon the very word signiﬁer itself as involving
an essentially metaphysical concept. When Le´vi-Strauss, in his preface to Le Cru et le cuit, says that he “has
attempted to transcend the opposition between the sensory and the intelligible by immediately installing
[himself] on the level of signs,” the necessity, the force, and the legitimacy of his gesture cannot allow us to
overlook the fact that the concept of the sign cannot in itself transcend this opposition between the sensory
and the intelligible. It is itself determined by that opposition, utterly and completely and throughout its
entire history. Its vitality derives precisely from that opposition and from the systemwhich the latter sets up’
(Jameson, supra note 17, 185–6). NB: I have opted here for Jameson’s translation, which, I believe, is superior
to the ‘ofﬁcial’ one by Alan Bass. Cf. J. Derrida,Writing and Difference (1978), 281.
31. Cf. P. Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State (2002).
32. Cf. Laclau and Mouffe, supra note 27, at xiii: ‘This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes the
representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is what we call a hegemonic relation.’
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one must also recognize that hegemonies, like exclusions, also come in different
stripes and colours. The ‘hegemonies of love’ (paternalism, Crusades, and all the
other so-called ‘civilizing missions’), for instance, it is believed, tend to be fairly
open about their hegemonic character. The ‘hegemonies of reason’ (imperialism,
empiricism, religious fundamentalism), on the other hand, seek to deny it.33 From
the poststructuralist point of view, the opposition between the two categories, of
course, tends to collapse as soon as it is posited, but the basic point they raise still
makes some sense, for there are, indeed, some hegemonic projects that are more
‘honest’ about themselves than others. The question then becomes: why do some
hegemonic projects become hegemonies of ‘reason’ and others of ‘love’? Or more
relevantly, under what conditions does the international law project become more
willing to admit its hegemonic nature? Could it be that Lucien Goldmannwas right
and it all has something to do with ‘being in power’, i.e. that it is the mark of every
ruling ideology that it feels obliged to deny its ideological character?34 If that is so,
then, perhaps, it is pointless to keep telling the international human rights people
to wake up to the fact that they do not actually speak ‘truth to power’ but are part of
that ‘power’ themselves: they simply ‘won’t hear it’.
The third challenge which the notion of diffe´rance raises for international law de-
rives from the constant attention it draws to the unavoidability of hegemonism and
exclusionism in the construction of the international legal project. By emphasizing
the idea that hegemony and exclusion are ontologically inevitable, poststructural-
ism alerts us to the concrete political realities created by the different regimes of
international legality and the corresponding representations of these regimes in
the international law discourse. Consider as an illustration Catherine Dauvergne’s
essay from Critical Beings (pp. 83–99). Dauvergne’s main concern in ‘Making People
Illegal’ is to point out the increasing convergence of the immigration-related dis-
courses in the First World countries and to expose the ideological signiﬁcance of
the terms of this convergence. Increasingly, she observes, the identity of the Third
World migrants in the First World contexts is coming to be constructed not with
reference to their national origins (or some other relatively ‘personal’ features) but
in terms of those FirstWorld laws which their intendedmigration patterns seem to
violate. By identifying these laws as the base point againstwhich the globalmigrant
subjectivity is discursively ﬁxed, such practices not only legitimize the underlying
exclusionarypoliciesbydepoliticizingthem,naturalizingthem,andemptyingthem
of their problematic content, but also essentialize, decontextualize, andmystify the
migrantﬁgure, evokingatonce theambivalent imageryof the ‘barbarianat thegates’
and, through the label ‘illegal’, the notion of the hostis humani generis (an enemy of
humanity as awhole).
What does it mean to exhaust a person’s being with a single descriptor ‘illegal’?
‘The label “illegal” is empty of content’, writes Dauvergne. ‘It circumscribes identity
solely in terms of a relationship with law: those who are illegal have broken (our)
33. The current patterns of hegemonismpracticed in the international arena incline in this direction. SeeMartti
Koskenniemi’s essay in Law, Justice, and Power, 46–69, and Sundhya Pahuja’s essay in Critical Beings, 161–79.
34. See L. Goldmann, The Hidden God (1964).
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law. [I]llegals are transgressors – and nothing else – by deﬁnition’ (Critical Beings,
pp. 92–3). To ﬂatten someone’s identity into the category ‘illegal’ is to prejudge their
claim to recognition as a legal subject35 in the most effective and terrifying way; it
is to say, ‘you do not exist in the eyes of the law because the law thinks you have not
shown enough respect for it’.
Unsurprisingly, as soon as one starts to look at the ‘nominalization of illegality’
from this angle one is immediately led to recall Foucault’s third version of polit-
ics: politics as an avowedly ‘non-political’ project of ‘cleansing’ the society of its
unwanted elements.36 The moment one begins to see things in this way, however,
one also develops a completely new appreciation of the Fukuyamian end-of-history
thesis. The third version of politics, according to Foucault, comes essentially into
existence only when the discourse of political struggle starts to give way to the
discourse of racial purity:
the theme of historical war –with its battles, its invasions, its looting, its victories, and
its defeats – [is] replaced by the postevolutionist theme of the struggle for existence.
It is no longer a battle in the sense that a warrior would understand the term, but a
struggle in the biological sense . . . . Similarly, the theme of the binary society which
is divided into two races or two groups with different languages, laws, and so on [is]
replaced by that of a society that is, in contrast, biologically monist. [This society is no
longer split into two warring factions.] Its only problem is this: it is threatened by a
certain number of heterogeneous elements which are not essential to it, . . . which are
in a sense accidental [–] the deviants who are this society’s by-products.37
TheanalogywiththeColdWarandthesubsequentdevelopmentof the international
society is impossible to miss. A new caste of global outcasts is fast coming into
existence but this time around even theirmoral right to be identiﬁed as ‘the enemy’
will be denied. Such is the new logic of the international political process.
‘Making people illegal,’ observes Dauvergne, ‘reﬂects an increasingly globally co-
herentviewthat thereareproperandimproperreasons tomigrate.’ In thenineteenth
century peoplemigrated to other countries because they sought a better life. Today,
it is only the First Worlders and the highly skilled labourers from the Third World
who are expected to take advantage of the economicmobility opportunities offered
by modern globalization (Critical Beings, pp. 94–5). All the rest are simply expected
to remain forever in their global u¨ber-ghettoes, the garbage-heap of a superﬂuous
humanity (Law, Justice, and Power, pp. 1–2 (Cheng)).
The problem with that expectation – completely deluded as it is, of course –
is that even though the regime of the global economic apartheid is indeed fast
becoming a political reality, the global underclass who populate its Third World
reservations, as many critics have quite correctly pointed out,38 are not actually all
that superﬂuous. Everything else aside, it is they who today operate the informal
sectorof theglobaleconomy, the incomefromwhichsustains theeconomicdynamic
35. Cf. Art. 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere
as a person before the law.’
36. See M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended (2003), 59–62, 80–2, 254–60.
37. Ibid., 80–1.
38. See, e.g., S. Zˇizˇek, ‘Knee-Deep’, (2004) 26 (17) London Review of Books, 2 Sept. 2004.
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of its formal cousin, and supply the cheap labour force thatkeeps thedreamofglobal
outsourcing aﬂoat and the myth of the ‘golden straitjacket’ in circulation. It is they,
moreover, who provide that constitutive outside of poverty and barbarism against
which the FirstWorld stories of civilization, humandignity, progress, and economic
development acquire their ethical and political identity andmultiply their utopian
capital.
The mainstream discourse about law and globalization has never acknowledged
the existence of this caste of global refuse´s. It is only their social antipodes – the
international civil servants, international non-governmental organization activists,
global chief executive ofﬁcers, and all the rest of that ‘transnational normentrepren-
eur’ crowd, these self-appointed postmodern Illuminati, who claim to run the ‘real
new world order’ through their ‘transnational issue networks’ – that register on its
radar screen.39 For most international lawyers, the oppressed and the dispossessed
exist only in the shape of voiceless victims, preferably dead, imprisoned, disap-
peared, or ethnically cleansed (or, failing that, exiled, displaced, interned, separated
by salt water, or otherwise shut up and, therefore, ‘presently unavailable’ for con-
tact, personal visit, or some other form of self-representation as concrete embodied
existences). Thewretched arenothingbut a political symbol, an additional footnote,
a formal pretext for a new lex ferenda.
Is this, however, a sign of a classic ivory-towerism and amateurish ignorance? It
maywell be. But insofar asmost of the political and economic oppression occurring
in the world today is actually a product of the ﬁeld of possibilities created by
the current institutional structure installed and maintained, inter alia, through the
instrumentality of international law, one cannot but begin to suspect that theremay
be something else going on there, something other than just a mere ‘myopia of the
maidens’. After all, is it not true that ‘[t]he Other is good [only] insofar as it remains a
victim (which is why we are bombarded with pictures of helpless Kosovar mothers,
children, and the elderly, all telling moving stories of their suffering); the moment
it no longer behaves as a victim but wants to strike back [against its oppressors],
it suddenly, magically turns into a terrorist/fundamentalist/drug-trafﬁcking Other’
(Law, Justice, and Power, p. 36 (Zˇizˇek))?
To the extent to which legal poststructuralism seeks to decentre these dubious
ﬁxationsof themainstreamdiscourse and raise thequestionof their ideological bias,
its contribution to the scholarly project of international law cannot but be greeted
with a tentative look of hope.With hope, however, must also come caution.
The second challenge which legal poststructuralism raises for the project of in-
ternational law, as I mentioned earlier, derives from the acknowledgement of law’s
total contingency. Seen from the poststructuralist perspective, all objectivities, real
or imagined, appear as utterly impermanent and dynamic phenomena, inherently
prone to momentary transmogriﬁcation. To the extent to which the rules and in-
stitutions of international law are recognized as leading an objective existence, it
39. See, e.g.,H.Koh, ‘Bringing InternationalLawHome’, (1998) 35HoustonLawReview623;H.Koh, ‘Transnational
Legal Process’, (1996) 75Nebraska LawReview 181; A.-M. Slaughter, ‘The Real NewWorldOrder’, (1997) 76 (5)
Foreign Affairs 183.
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follows that they can do so only in the Renanian sense of a ‘ple´biscite de tous les
jours’: now it is here, now it is not. Like a cloud of smoke, a rule of international
law is at once ephemeral and real, both dense and concrete enough to block out
the sunlight of ‘pure politics’ with a pacta sunt servanda strictness, and unstable and
volatile enough to dissolve instantly into the thin air under the blow of rebus sic
stantibus.
All law is living law, teaches legal poststructuralism; living not in the sense of
‘yesterday’s breach is tomorrow’s norm’, but more in the sense of ‘the universe is,
instantby instant, re-createdanew . . . Blinkyour eyes, and theworldyouseenextdid
not existwhenyou closed them’.40 Being a consistent poststructuralist, it seems, one
mustnotonlyendorse theviewthat all structural constructs, including, for instance,
the doctrine of functional immunity and the principle of the self-determination of
nations, are inherently contingent and unstable, but also openly accept the idea
that aporia, antinomianism,41 and interdisciplinarity are the deﬁning features of all
decision-makingprocesses, including the legal process and, however one goes about
it, this is not a view that is likely to sit well with the general public.
Whether one likes it or not, it seems generally irrefutable that, taken as a whole,
the international law profession42 is ‘hired’ and ‘paid’ by the rest of the society to
impersonate the likes of a Fullerian Rex or aDworkineanHercules, not a Schmittian
decisionist.Certainly, someofusmaygenuinelybelieve thatposingasaDworkinean
Hercules, with however many disclaimers, is a task as silly and ludicrous as it is
immoral and dishonest. But that does not for a moment change the fact that most
of the rest of society do not share this view. The terms of the profession’s implicit
contract with the general public quite unequivocally seem to stipulate that the
‘invisible college of international law’ will keep its current jobs only so long as it
is seen to live up to that ideal. Stepping on the poststructuralist path, under such
conditions, is effectively equivalent to advising your boss that he hasmade a serious
mistakehiringyou–whatare theoddsyouwill stillbe inyourworkbynextMonday?
And given what was said earlier about the state of employment opportunities in
the ﬁeld of international law, what are the odds that the rest of your colleagues will
follow in your footsteps?
4. ON INTERDISCIPLINARITY
One of the most important phenomena in contemporary international law schol-
arship is, undoubtedly, interdisciplinarity. ‘International law and international re-
lations’, ‘international law and economics’, ‘international law and gender studies’ –
whichever way one turns today, an interdisciplinarism of one kind or another
constantly tries to raise its head above the parapet of traditional doctrinalism. In
40. T. Pratchett, Thief of Time (2001), 39.
41. Further on antinomianism, see Duncan Kennedy, ‘A Semiotics of Critique’, (2001) 22 Cardozo Law Review
1147, at 1158–69.
42. I am perfectly aware of Sarat’s warning not to reify the legal profession or treat it as more of a unitary body
than it really is (see A. Sarat, ‘The Profession versus the Public Interest: Reﬂections on Two Reiﬁcations’,
(2002) 54 Stanford Law Review 1491), but on this occasion, I think, the generalization is warranted.
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McNair’s days itwaspopular tobeable to tell thedifferencebetween lawandnot-law
and to retain some kind of loyalty to the former.43 Today, it seems to have become
fashionable to insist that the former is always defective without the latter and that
it cannot, therefore, ever survive on its own.44
Whichever way one goes about it, interdisciplinarism has, nevertheless, not yet
become a completely self-evident stance in modern international law. You cannot
just take off on an interdisciplinary note as soon as you feel like it. The reader has
to be warned and wooed ﬁrst. Moreover, as with every other game of courtship,
there are certain rules and conventions you have to follow. You cannot just say,
for instance, ‘look, I promise you, interdisciplinarity is fun’ or ‘why don’t we try
something new today?’ The case for interdisciplinarization has to be made step by
step and advanced onwhat should seem like objective grounds. The reader must be
convinced that the move to interdisciplinarity is dictated by a genuine, objective
necessity, not a simple choice.
Seenagainst this background,howdo the twovolumesweare reviewinghere fare
on the interdisciplinarity front? ‘Thenewmillenniumdawns,’ announces the editor
of Law, Justice, and Power, ‘with a pressing need for fresh strategies to counteract
abuses of law, justice, and power.’ The ‘force of globalization needs to be taken up
on its own terms before we can ﬁnd somewise and appropriate answers to some of its
problematic consequences . . . .Only a multidisciplinary volume would enable us to see
how law . . . is “everywhere” – both “majestic and ordinary,” thoroughly penetrating
every aspect of culture and society’ (Law, Justice, and Power, p. 2, emphasis added).
The ‘interminable elevations of the global’ cannot be understood by analyt-
ical ‘reduction of the global to the powers of nations’, declare the editors of
Critical Beings. The ontology of the global lies ‘beyond the reach of nations’
(p. xi). To a large extent, of course, it is predicated on the multitude of individual
human beings; nevertheless, ‘The critical beings of our title [are not the same entity
as the] individual subjects of international law and of particular international and
regional juridical forums’ (p. xix). Rather, ‘These are [the] people excludedormargin-
alized in the persistent but ever unsettled processes of national/global afﬁrmation’
(p. xi). ‘In their ambivalent relation to law, to nation and the global lies the promise of
new consciousnesses, and ways of thinking and relating to the world. To suggest this,
however, is not to assert that our critical beings are orientated along deﬁnite paths,
pursuing deﬁnite claims, and establishing particular, identiﬁable “rights” . . . . What
the critical beings of our account do is challenge the theoretical trajectories that domin-
ate somuchof the literature that creates andpurports to account for the “newglobal
juridical order”’ (p. xix, emphasis added).
Consider now, for a moment, the argument sequence rehearsed in these two
passages. At ﬁrst sight everything seems to be quite straightforward: the occurrence
of an ontological rupture has necessitated the execution of an epistemological
reform: (i) something called ‘globalization’ started happening, as a result of which a
43. See R. Jennings, ‘ClosingAddress’, inC. Bro¨lmann et al. (eds.),Peoples andMinorities in International Law (1993),
341, 344.
44. Cf. Law, Justice, and Power, 2–4 (Cheng).
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series of unprecedented challengeshave beenposed to international law; (ii) noneof
the old frames of reference can enable us to understand these challenges or engage
with them in the way in which they deserve to be engaged; consequently, (iii) we
must all now turn to interdisciplinarity. Leaving themethodological overture at this
stage, onewouldprobablyﬁndno signiﬁcant problemswith the rest of the proposed
discourse. But let us try to look at the presented arguments again, from a slightly
more reﬂective angle.
How do we know that the ‘old frames of reference’ are epistemologically inad-
equate to deal with ‘globalization’? The argument in favour of interdisciplinarism
advanced by legal poststructuralism seems to rest on some kind of logical circle:
(i) because of globalization (event one) everyone must turn to interdisciplinarity
(event two); however, (ii) to be able to verify why this is actually so, i.e. to see why
statement (i) is correct, everyone needs to have already become interdisciplinarian.
In other words, event two must always be ready to take place/have taken place
before event one can begin to look sensible. Put differently, either we ought to have
always-already been interdisciplinarian but kept this fact about ourmethodological
allegiance an absolute secret from everyone else (which is another way of saying
that we need always to have hated the established disciplinary tradition of interna-
tional law and to think that only nowhavewe a ﬁtting excuse to badmouth it in the
open), orwe ought to be ready tomake a leap of faith into that twilight zone beyond
reason and will, where event one and event two have already ended before even
beginning. (Kierkegaard, with his penchant for crisp descriptions, would probably
call this themoment ofmadness.) Eitherway the constructed argument in favour of
interdisciplinarism seems to fail the established convention by not grounding the
call for interdisciplinarization inanobjective justiﬁcation,which inevitably leads to
a number of newquestions.What exactly is so great about interdisciplinarity? Is the
discipline of international law really that narrow-minded and intellectually poor
that on the threshold of the new century any methodological stance that has the
words ‘lawandsomething’ in itsheading looksnecessarilybetter thanstaying ‘inside
the box’?What precisely are themethodological limits of that discipline which the
interdisciplinarian crowd calls ‘law’ and beyond which it asks us to aspire?
The unreservedly enthusiastic view which the two volumes in question take
of interdisciplinarity is certainly not unproblematic. Take, for instance, the essays
contributed by the 15 non-lawyers. As different as they are from one another, most
of them tend to suspend the question of what their authors understand by ‘law’
without at the same time, however, suspending their discussions of it.What kind of
discursive practices can a stance like this generate?
To be sure, the idea of diffe´rance may be a really great idea, but there is still a
world of difference between refusing to take a ﬁnal position on a given question
and not engaging with it with any degree of commitment whatsoever. It is one
thing for an ontologist to insist that he must forever defer the question of what
constitutes the original trace of Being; it is a completely different thing for someone
purporting towrite about law and globalization to bracket out the question of what
he understands by these terms and yet to proceed with the discussion. For the fact
remains that noneof us is free from the enslaving grasp of the conventionalwisdom.
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Thelesswequestionourassumptions, themorelikelywearetofall foroneoranother
set of urban legends, and being an insightful economist or psychoanalyst does not
(yet) immunize one against becoming a trite jurisprude. For good or ill, the truth
of the matter is that most of the theories non-lawyers entertain about the nature of
international law are embarrassingly silly.
5. WHEN THE RENEWAL FORGETS ITSELF
Every time I hear a distinguished non-lawyer offer a pearl of wisdom to the legal
profession I recall a short comment made by Duncan Kennedy some 15 years ago.
The immediate occasion at the time was the discussion of Foucault’s potential
contribution tomodern jurisprudence. Comparing Foucault’s insightswith those of
Robert Lee Hale, the American legal realist scholar fromColumbia, Kennedy, wrote:
It is, I think, instructive to compare Hale’s approach to Michel Foucault’s. Both start
from themore or less categorical rejection of twogreat traditions: that of classical liber-
alism,which tended to restate the outcomes of social conﬂict as voluntary agreements;
and that of orthodox Marxism, which tended to restate these same outcomes as the
unilateral exercise of the power of capital over labour. Bothwriters choose power over
liberty as a central concept (and in this extend the Marxist tradition), but both reject
an understanding of power as unilateral imposition, emphasizing its situational, bilat-
eral, and indeterminate character (and in this extend the liberal tradition) . . . . Along
with the similarities, there are great differences between the approaches of Hale and
Foucault. There is, I think, a sense inwhich Foucault is inferior toHale and that is in his
presentation of the role of law. There is also a sense in which Foucault is his superior,
and that is in his understanding of the pervasive constituting role of power in the
‘social body’ . . . . I don’t ﬁnd Foucault’s assertion of ‘absolute heterogeneity’ between
legal anddisciplinary discourse convincing, nor his very tight connectionbetween law
and sovereignty, nor his call to ﬁght disciplinary power through ‘a new form of law,
one whichmust indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the
principle of sovereignty’ . . . . Oliver Wendell Holmes criticized the great English pos-
itivist John Austin on the ground that he approached law as a ‘criminalist’, meaning
that he was obsessively focused on the fact that the sovereign orders or prohibits acts
on pain of a sanction . . . . Foucault is unmistakably a ‘criminalist’ in his understanding
of law.45
What I think Kennedy was trying to say in this passage is essentially this. First,
legal scholarscancertainly learna lot fromFoucault.His theoriesof socializationand
subject-constitution are far superior to anything the traditional legal scholarship
has been able to offer on this front so far. Second, whatever wisdom we may gain
from foucault does not actually include his ‘immediately jurisprudential’ views.
Foucault’s own understanding of what the law is and how it works was, to put it
mildly, a tad too simplistic. Maybe he should have consulted better legal theorists
before ﬁnalizing his views who knows. Ormaybe he was just out of his depthwhen
it came to jurisprudence – nobody’s perfect. In any event, and this is the third point,
Foucault’s programmatic prescriptions about law – his vision of what we have to
45. Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!’, (1991) XV Legal Studies Forum 327, at 351–7.
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do with/through/to law – if you consider them as they are, are on the whole quite
untenableandtoocrude tobe takenseriously: ‘Foucaultgives lawanimportantplace
inhis general social theory, buthis versionof law is, unfortunately, prerealist’.46 This
said, there is also, I think, a fourth message in Kennedy’s article and that is: ‘Had
legal scholars not managed to forget what people like Hale taught some seventy or
eighty years ago, perhaps we should not have had to reinvent the wheel today’, but
more on this later.
The idea that law is a dynamic, multifaceted phenomenon, contingent and un-
stable, but nevertheless powerful and ubiquitous, so passionately advanced by the
legal poststructuralists, is not, of course, a new one. More than 70 years ago (people
known today as) legal realists expounded exactly the sameviews.47 To be sure, seven
decades have taken a rather considerable toll on their theories. Some of their ideas
today sound hopelessly naı¨ve, others seem lacking in sufﬁcient conceptual rigour.
But for a school of thought that had espoused contingency, complexity, and tem-
porality some 40 years before Foucault and Derrida ever published anything, legal
realism still seems to be in a terriﬁc shape.
Certainly, one should not ﬂinch every time one hears a non-lawyer preach to
the legal profession howwe should go about doing our jobs. Despite the numerous
cosmeticchangesonthesurfaceof its ‘highscholarship’,modern international lawis
still toosolipsisticandnarrow-mindedasadiscursiveenterprise todeclare itself tobe
inthepositiontodeclineanykindofofferings,howevernaı¨veor inept theymaylook,
from other disciplines. Moreover, given the enormous importance of the modern
international law project as the discursive site of global power processes, it seems
rather self-evident that, in a society aspiring to think of itself as democratic, people
from outside the international law ‘profession’ must always have an opportunity to
contribute their say to the debate about international law. To the extent to which
the life of the law is indeed led in the ﬁeld of pain and death48 and the reach of
international law covers the whole world, the international law discourse has no
right to remainanexclusive clubaccessibleonly toaprivilegedcasteof quasi-priests,
if only because the non-lawyers should be able to choose how they die too, or at least
to have a say inwhat it takes – or should take – for a thinly disguised neo-colonialist
war over natural resources to be considered lawful.49 Too much is at stake to try to
afford otherwise.
46. Ibid., at 327.
47. See, e.g., F. Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’, (1935) Columbia Law Review
809; J. Frank, ‘Legal Thinking in Three Dimensions’, (1949) 1 Syracuse Law Review 9; L. Green, ‘The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases’, (1928) 28 Columbia Law Review 1014 and (1929) 29 Columbia Law Review 255;
R. Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State’, (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly
470; Llewellyn, supra note 21.
48. Cf. R. Cover, ‘Violence and theWord’, (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1601.
49. Cf. U. Bernitz et al., ‘Letter to the Editor’,Guardian, 7 March 2003: ‘A decision to undertakemilitary action in
Iraq without proper Security Council authorization will seriously undermine the international rule of law.
Of course, even with that authorization, serious questions would remain. A lawful war is not necessarily
a just, prudent or humanitarian war.’ Cf. M. Craven et al., ‘We Are Teachers of International Law’, (2004),
17 LJIL 363, 370: ‘Aren’t we reinforcing here the idea that justice is something you know, and furthermore
knowledge to which we have privileged access, as opposed to something that gets deﬁned and redeﬁned in
the crucible of social struggle?’
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Andanyway,other than thenewChicagoaneconomists,50 whocansay todaywith
any degree of conﬁdence what exactly constitutes ‘the limits of international law’?
The main legacy of the ‘pragmatic revolution’ of the 1950s, let us remember, was
the realization that international lawpossessed an immensepolitical potential.51 Its
ideological counterpart correspondingly was the realization that the international
law discipline had no distinct identity of its own. The emperor, it turned out, never
wore any clothes; all there had ever beenwas just a tradition and a set of historically
contingent habits.52 ‘It is revolting’, said Oliver Wendell Holmes once, ‘to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so itwas laid down in the timeofHenry IV’.53
Clearly, it is no less revolting to insist that a textbook of international law should
have as its natural ﬁeld of coverage the law governing the use of military force but
not economic aggression, the use of rivers as international boundaries but not as a
source of drinkable water, the international responsibility of states and individuals
but not that of transnational corporations, for no other better reason than that ‘this
is what international lawyers have always written about’.
There is nothing sacred or self-evidently right about sticking to the established
disciplinary consensus. As Foucault himself would say, ‘when I see you straining to
establish [what constitutes the true international lawdiscourse] I donot really think
that you are demonstrating once and for all [what the natural subject matter of the
international law discourse is]; forme you are doing something altogether different,
you are investing [particular types of international law] discourses and those who
uphold them with . . . power.’54 The more there are alternative ways of looking at
international law, themoredemocratically responsible the international lawproject
can become – that much is clear. The enabling potentiality of interdisciplinarism,
at this point, is obvious and virtually impossible to ignore. To resist epistemological
pluralism on this level is to occupy a profoundly suspect ideological stance.
Having said this, one must also recognize the fact that interdisciplinarity can
hardly be considered an unqualiﬁed blessing. Respect placed where it is due, far too
often, reading interdisciplinary writings one tends to ﬁnd oneself feeling slightly
embarrassed on behalf of their authors and profoundly annoyed on behalf of their
purported target audiences.
To be sure, interdisciplinarism does make reading law books a lot more fun.
But this does not mean that the ‘view from outside’ cannot at the same time be
quite unintelligible, incoherent, or completely beside the point, or, worse still, daft,
pretentious, and recklessly uninformed.55
50. See J. Goldsmith and E. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005).
51. For a telling account of this discovery, see, e.g., O. Schachter, ‘Dag Hammarskjo¨ld and the Relation of Law to
Politics’, (1962) 56 AJIL 1.
52. For a brief review of this development, see, e.g., David Kennedy, ‘A New Stream of International Law Schol-
arship’, (1988) 7Wisconsin International Law Journal 1, 4–5 (‘the post-war generation expanded the practice of
international law by sacriﬁcing its distinctive intellectual self-image and coherence’).
53. See O. Holmes, ‘The Path of Law’, (1997) 110Harvard Law Review 991, 1001.
54. M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge (1980), 85.
55. Or maybe I am just over-reacting. For a more tempered reaction along the same lines to Agamben’s writings
on Guanta´namo Bay, see F. Jones, ‘Guanta´namo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’, (2005) 16 EJIL
613, 623–8.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 02 Apr 2012 IP address: 130.209.6.42
822 REVIEW ESSAYS
It seemsdifﬁcult to imagine, for instance, how statements like ‘sovereigns have at
their disposal an uncommon form of speech: sovereign sentences [which by virtue
of their sovereign nature] remain outside of the legal order’, or ‘sovereignty [means]
exemption from legal processes’ (Law, Justice, and Power, p. 97 (Fenves)), would ever
be taken seriously under the rubric of ‘progressive thought’ if they were made by
an international lawyer. And while the suggestion that ‘as long as the threat of a
[sovereign sentence] has not been fully extinguished, no legal process can be sure
that itwillhave the lastword [, or, indeed,] theﬁrstone’ (p.100) isnotentirelywithout
parallel inmodern doctrinal scholarship, its thoughtlessness, onemust admit, is not
therebymade any less irritating. Just because there aremany unintelligent passages
‘inside the box’, it does not mean that it is okay to import more at bulk prices.56
One does not have to have gone far along the path of legal education to discover
the argument that (i) if sovereignty can trump the legal process, it can do so only
to the extent to which the latter has already provided it with such an opportunity,
for it is within the domain of the law that the notion of sovereignty is constituted;
and (ii) when a sovereign act thus conceived suspends the application of a legal
norm, that, too, is in itself a legal act. There is, if one thinks about it carefully,
nothing ‘threatening ’ – nor can there be – about sovereign sentences as far as the
legal process is concerned. Of course, as ethical and political subjects, some of us
may dislike those legal processes which grant sovereigns too much leeway and an
opportunity to churn out as many sovereign sentences as they like, but that does
not in itself make these processes – unless, of course, we decide to turn into natural
lawyers or endorse some other form of legal transcendentalism/fundamentalism –
any less legal or, indeed, deprive them of their ‘last’ or ‘ﬁrst’ word about sovereignty,
just as the formal binding of the sovereign by legal rules does not – unless, that is, we
turn into the die-hard fetishists of the legal form – by itself make the corresponding
regime of governance any more ‘legal’. Again, reading people like Hale (or, for that
matter, Kelsen) would probably not have been such a bad idea.
Probably it is because all of its contributors have some basic background in law –
nine of eleven are legal scholars – that the interdisciplinarismofCritical Beings tends
to look somewhat more convincing than – or, rather, not as misplaced as – that
of Law, Justice, and Power. Where the former reads as a serious contribution to the
international legal theory debate, the latter – with the predictable exceptions of
the true-to-form, excellent essays from Martti Koskenniemi on the history of uni-
versalism in international law (pp. 46–69) and Peter Fitzpatrick on law’s attraction
for ﬁnalities (pp. 207–22) – reads more like a parody or a rebellion against what its
56. By the same token, other than the above-mentioned observation about wanting to see the Other as weak
and voiceless, I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to see what Law, Justice, and Power’s target reader, however interdisciplinary
she may be, can gain from Slavoj Zˇizˇek’s (partly recycled) ruminations about NATO and global capitalism.
Certainly, it is not for statements like ‘[theMultilateral Agreement on Investment] will basically undermine
the sovereignty of nations by assigningpower to the corporations that is almost equal to that of the countries
in which these corporations are located’, or ‘The recent catastrophic economic situation in Russia, far from
being the heritage of old socialist mismanagement, is a direct result of this global capitalist logic embodied
inMAI’ (Law, Justice, and Power, 31), that one of themost engaging thinkers of our day deserves to be known
by international lawyers.
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introduction suggests it could have become. Then again, rebelling and parodying
are perhaps what poststructuralism is all about.
In the sameyearwhenDuncanKennedy tried tobringHaleandFoucault together,
David Kennedy wrote,
[there is] a sense in sophisticated postmodern cultural criticism that law is supposed to
be something,mustbe, or should strive tobe, or isunthinkable asother thansomething
that we do not subject to [postmodern] techniques . . . . It is all right to postmodernize
other areas or culture zones, but law is too associated with power or authority, or
order, or whatever to feel comfortable once modernity is left behind . . . . Perhaps too
crudely put, I think the idea here is a division of labor in which the lawyers would be
responsible for holding it all together against all odds while the culture people took it
apart. I think it is a bad job, and I do not think we can do it . . . . I just do not think law
is like that. It does not have [any of those] qualities of ﬁxity, order, meaning, or identity
[which the cultural critics ascribe to it.] . . . Of course we certainly operate with ideas
that sometimes seem very crude to a postmodernist [but] if the challenge raised for
lawyers . . . is that we should get hip to postmodernism as a compelling description of
the contemporary social scene and a cool way to be, I guessmy answerwould be . . . we
lawyers have [already] been postmodern for a while.57
Perhaps I should just leave it at that. Or perhaps I should bring it back to Foucault
and his famous question: ‘what types of knowledge do youwant to disqualify in the
very instant of your demand [that this, too, is international law discourse]? Which
speaking, discoursing subjects – which subjects of experience and knowledge –
do you then want to “diminish” when you say: “I who conduct this discourse am
conducting a [true international law] discourse, and I am [an international lawyer]”?
Which theoretical-political avant-garde do youwant to enthrone in order to isolate
it from all the discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate about it?’58
6. CONCLUSION
Books, Umberto Eco once said, often speak not of things, human or divine, that
lie outside them, but of other books, shifting slowly in a centuries-old murmuring
conversation unmasterable by any human mind, least of all that of a scribe or a
conveyor.59 As I ﬁnished reading Critical Beings and Law, Justice, and Power, these
‘other books’ whose stiﬂed murmurs I heard most loudly were surprisingly not the
books by Derrida, Lacan, Levinas, or Foucault. They were, rather, the books written
by another generation of thinkers, those with a far stronger commitment to Kant
and the old tradition of Ko¨nigsberg.
Every book can be said to have what for lack of a better name one can call
the autochthonous principle of its rationality: an organizational logic that governs
its practical realization and thus determines what it can and cannot say, how it
says what it can say and how it does not say what it cannot say, which of these
things can be changed, under what conditions, and so on. It is a principle that is
57. David Kennedy, ‘SomeComments on Law and Postmodernism: A SymposiumResponse to Professor Jennifer
Wicke’, (1991) 62University of Colorado Law Review 475, 480–2.
58. Foucault, supra note 54, at 85.
59. U. Eco, The Name of the Rose (1983), 286.
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neither inscribed anywhere in particular (searching for it in the opening chapter, for
instance, is a completewaste of time) nor formulated independently of the book, but
is rather embodied inall thosematerial effects that serveas themediumof thebook’s
realization and the origin of its speciﬁcity: the sequence of the book’s narratives, the
combination of its master plots, the structure of its arguments, the richness of its
vocabulary, and so on. Pinning down such principles, rendering them visible to the
naked eye, is never an easy job. Onewould be ill-advised to believe otherwise. Books
are not reducible to anything other than themselves, and there is no such thing as
a view from nowhere with which one could approach every book in a fair, neutral,
and equitable way. Part of the cruelty of the centuries-old conversation described by
Eco is that we always speak from within other books, even when we are not aware
of that.
The books from within which I speak here – or at least those that I am aware
of – are the books of critical legal scholars, left-wing modernist philosophers, post-
modern cultural studies people, and structuralist literary theorists.60 They are books
mostly written in the shadow – and against the background – of the ‘original’ post-
structuralists and their epigones andoftenbecauseof theirwork. Thevoice inwhich
this leads me to speak, then, is also – if only through the contaminatory power of
diffe´rance – the voice of a poststructuralist. It is with this recognition in mind that
I believe I am writing these remarks. Then again, what one says one believes and
what one does believe are not necessarily (or even often) the same thing, and the last
set of remarks I am going to offer here is precisely about that.
The voice in which Critical Beings and Law, Justice, and Power add their contri-
butions to the centuries-old conversation about international law is a very strange
voice. In terms of its substantive employment, it is used in both cases to articulate
the need to change the existing international legal practice, disciplinarize interdis-
ciplinarism, explore otherness, and reopen every epistemic consensus in modern
international law scholarship. On the background aesthetic level, however, it con-
stantly reverberates with the same tone of self-conﬁdence andmonolithicity which
one usually ﬁnds in traditional legal scholarship and that is, probably, where the
mainironythatcharacterizes thesetwobookslies: it isnot thateachof themattempts,
in its own way, to formulate, however disjointedly, a vision of an international law
that would be both universal in its origins and egalitarian in its effects, without
recognizing at the same time that the kaleidoscopic bouquet of philosophical teach-
ings which serves as their ideological platform does not really allow this, but that,
amidst the intensity of their brilliance and improvisation, each of them regularly
loses sight of its own sermon, as if trying to bear out the old poststructuralist thesis
about the uncontrollability ofwriting and prove right all of Pierre Schlag’s concerns
about thedomesticationofdeconstruction.61 Seeking todecentre thealleged objectof
their substantive discourse (law, globalization, justice), they constantly leave aside
the effective subject position from whose imputed point of view that decentring
gets offered, producing as a result a truly uncanny re-enactment of the classic
60. See supra and infra notes 1, 3, 8–11, 13, 14, 16–18, 20, 24, 27, 28, 41, 52, 57, 62, 73.
61. See supra note 20.
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vanguard-intellectuals-inform-the-masses-what-the-truth-really-is scenario. (Not
that mainstream scholarship is not guilty of the same sin – it is, and always has
been – but at least most of its participants can cite the excuse of never suspecting
that ‘the Author is dead’62 and that each of them, therefore, is ‘a language game run
by bureaucratic, institutional, and linguistic practices’.63)
For, indeed, as Schlag pointed out, if we are to take the idea of legal poststructur-
alism seriously, preaching about deconstruction and applying it to those things in law
that attract our initial attention are not really enough. Tobe sure, both of these activ-
ities may help – they may even be necessary, no one denies that – but what is really
required, in the end, if we are to stay loyal to our poststructuralist impulses, is not
so much a special form of self-consciousness or a mastery of some fancy analytical
technique, but ‘a displacement, a subversion of the discursive practices that consti-
tute each of us’.64 Every other scenario will only lead to an eventual endorsement of
the old jurocentric ﬁction in which the point of the interdisciplinarymission – and
whosaid thatpoststructuralism,once it is ‘codiﬁed’, cannot constitute adiscipline?–
is limited to ‘applying the conceptual vocabulary and grammar of a foreign discip-
line . . . to theﬁeld of law,’ so that ‘the foreign discipline [may apparently acquire] the
status of a constituting subjectivity [that is invited] to describe, organize, and explain
law – not the other way around,’65 while in reality ‘in this very privileging of the
foreign ﬁeld, the foreign ﬁeld is privileged in a distinctly legal, logocentricmanner[,
employed] as an instrument, a technique to resolve in an authoritative manner a
legally deﬁned set of problems’.66
Perhaps it is becausemost of the contributors to the Law, Justice and Power volume
havevirtuallynoexperienceof theeverydaylifeof thelegalproject that thecollective
takewhich this collection of essays offers on the law front so easily falls into the rut
of the traditional legal scholarship with its imageries of the law as a hypostatized
self-coherent process.67 Or maybe it is because not having much of an idea about
who does (international) legal theory these days, they decided to err on the safe
side and adopted a voice one might expect someone who spends half of his days
ﬁghting the ghosts of H. L. A. Hart and John Austin to be able to understand. Who
knows? With almost a dozen contributors, it is difﬁcult to offer an accurate guess.
But what becomes increasingly clear as one reads both books is this: even if one
of them may demonstrate a better awareness of the ongoing international law
debates, neither of them, in the end,manages to overcome the pull of the jurocentric
aesthetics:
the self of the legal thinker [is] a privileged individual subject[: he is] the author of his
own thoughts, the captain of his own ship, the Hercules of his own empire . . . . Later
on, out in the hall, in informal conversation, the legal thinker will, of course, readily
62. See R. Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, in R. Barthes, Image Music Text (1977), 142.
63. Schlag, supra note 20, at 1671.
64. Ibid., at 1640, n. 25.
65. Ibid., at 1651.
66. Ibid., at 1653.
67. See, especially but not exclusively, the essays by Robert Gibbs, Sinkwan Cheng, and Robert Fenves.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 02 Apr 2012 IP address: 130.209.6.42
826 REVIEW ESSAYS
admit that he is just as much a ﬁt subject for sociological, economic, psychoanalytic
explanations as thenext guy. Butwhenhe is doing law,whenhe is in role, the rhetorical
form of his statements will effectively deny all these twentieth-century knowledges in
favorofeighteenth-centuryLockeanfantasies.What’smore, the legal thinkerwill [also]
invite the authorized audience . . . to participate in the same fantasies[, treating and
constituting its]members . . . as [similarly] autonomous, coherent, integrated, ordinary
selves capable of rational argument andmoral choice.68
One cannot be fruitful unless one is ready tobe riddledwith contradictions,wrote
Nietzsche once.69 Perhaps he was right. Or perhaps where one sees contradictions
there really are none. Perhaps we should not look at Critical Beings and Law, Justice,
and Power through the prism of their (declared) inspirations and forerunners, be
it Derrida, Kant, or Anzilotti, and celebrate or lament their (dis-)loyalty to these
inspirations, but remember instead thatbooksare irreducible toanythingother than
themselves, and that evenwhen theMiddleAges ‘falsiﬁed sacred texts, interpolating
otherpassages’ into them, in sodoing it ‘wrote “its own”books’.70 Perhaps,we should
remember, as pop-zenists do, that every encounter produces a singular experience
that has to be valued on its own terms, not against any external yardsticks like
‘politics’, ‘justice’, or professional canons. In that case, the most important thing I
have to say about these two books is that what emerged at the end of my encounter
with themwas an awareness of an amusinglyHegelian –whatwith this whole pull-
of-history talk (‘the new millennium dawns with a pressing need’), the dialectical
supersecession of one epistemic ‘truth’ by another, an insistence on studying the
‘law in action in order to reveal [the] hidden complexity in the relationship between
law and justice’ constant hypostatization of justice as the universal spirit alienating
itself in (international) law, the immediate correspondence between the social logic
of globalization and the thought logic of interdisciplinarism–performance directed
in support of an essentially anti-Hegelian set of messages, which at times seemed to
overpower it and at other times to be subdued by the dictates of its formal aesthetics.
Was this what Nietzsche had inmind by ‘contradiction’? Probably. But even if it was
not it still resulted in an experience that was fruitful by any standard.
So here is, then, the last thing I think I should say about Critical Beings and Law,
Justice, and Power: these are very fruitful and rewarding books that deserve to be
read by every serious student of international law and legal theory, for even if they
are riddled with contradictions, each of them is only a testimony to their authors’
exceptional ambition and brilliance.
What isgoingtobe theeffectof thepoststructuralist intervention in international
law? Will it be to encourage international lawyers – by reminding them that now,
as ever before, everything in the international arena is only a transient product of
a contingent combination of traces and hegemonic self-exertions – to experience
68. Schlag, supra note 20, at 1637–9. Is the pull of the jurocentric aesthetics really so powerful? If it is, how
does one ever write a book about law (which a leading publisher would agree to publish) and remain a
deconstructionist?
69. F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ (2003), 54.
70. Eco, supra note 1, at 84.
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their everyday work as an ongoing exercise of power? Or will it be to discourage
all but the most dedicated of them, with its confusing vocabulary and uncritical
interdisciplinarism, fromperforming any other kind of intellectual operations than
a linear explication of the established dogma? Or will it, perhaps, simply tire them
with its dogged insistence that the existing tradition is too outdated and a new
method has to be created?
